Can extrinsic uncertainty (aniniral spirits," markett psychology," " sunspots,". . .) play a signihicant role in rational expectations e(JIilibrium models? We establish that extrinsic unce tainty cannot niatter in the static Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets. Bt we also establish that extrinsic uncertainty can matter in the overlapping-generations economy with complete i markets but where nanrket participation is limited to those consumers alive when the nvurkets are open. Equilibrium allocations in w hic h extrinsic unce rtainty plays n() role are Pareto optimal in the traditional sense. Equmilibritum allocations in which extrinsic uncertaintv does play a role aIe Pareto optimal in a (weaker) sensse which is appropriate to dynamic analysis.
I. Introduction
What is the best strategy for playing the stock market Sholtkh one concentrate on ftundarentals' or shotild one instead f(tcus on the psychology of the market'? These are interesting qtiestiolls for those who would like to get rich on Wall Street. They are also interesting for macroeconomists.
For Keynes and many Keynesians, the volatility of investment iS at least in part based on the volatility of inarket psychology or the aninml spirits of capitalists, or, more generally, extrinsic uncertainty. 1 his alleged unreliability of the intertemporal allocation of resources under laissez-faire capitalism is an important basis of the Keynesian natural, weaker sense, where each consumer is identified by his state of' birth (as well as by the other usual parameters-namely, tastes and endowments).
The upshot of this analysis is that in a rational expectations, general equilibrium world, the presence of extrinsic uncertainty-sunspots, waves of pessimism/optimism, and so forth-may well have real ef'-fects. The lesson for macroeconomics is that, even if one assumes the most favorable informational and institutional conditions imaginable, there may be a role for the government to stabilize fluctuations arising from seemingly noneconomic disturbances.
II. Extrinsic Uncertainty
The basic parameters defining an economy-such as endowments, preferences, and production possibilities-are referred to as the fundamentals of that economy. We make a sharp distinction between those things which influence the fundamentals and those which do not. If a variable has an effect on the fundamentals, we say that it is intrinsic (to the economy); otherwise, the variable is said to be extrinsic. Our basic question is: What effect can an extrinsic variable, say, sunspot activity, have on the allocation of' resources?
Before going further, we must introduce some elements of' our model; even the concept of extrinsic variable remains vague until it is applied in a formal framework. The model we adopt in this paper is the simplest possible for our purpose, but our results generalize quite readily. The more general arguments can be found in our working paper (Cass and Shell [1981] , esp. app. 1, pp. 29-39).
We assume that there are two standard commodities, i = 1, 2, and two possible states of nature, s = x, P. Let x,(s) denote consumption by consumer h of' commodity i in state s, let x/,(s) denote the vector of' 1 2 state-s consumptions, (xh(s), x,(s)), and let xx, denote the vector of' prospective consumptions, (x/,(c), xx,(3)) = (xl(0), xl,(xx), x(), xl,(3)).
Consumer h is endowed with prospective goods, denoted by the strictly positive vector w,, (W,( (), xl,(@)) = (w(), (e) xl,(@),
Wh(P)). The preferences of' Mr. h are described by the utility function, v1),(xh), which is defined over his prospective consumption plans. There is no production in our simple economy; the fundamentals are endowments and preferences. We assume that uncertainty is purely extrinsic, allowing us to think of the random variable s as representing sunspot activity, identifying x with the state "sunspots" and P with the state "no sunspots." Endowments are not affected by sunspot activity, that is, (l (0) = (lW4()
for each Ii. Conditions must also be imposed on preferences before we can say that uncertainty is extrinsic. We assume that consumer behavior is based on von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. Consumer h believes that sunspots occur with probability rT/,(cx) and that no sunspots occur with probability a(l3) = 1 -I (c). Preferences are then represented by the familiar expected utility criterion, that is, V1,(X/,(c), X,(13)) = rTJ,(ot) u/,(X/,(o)) + Tr,(13)u,(x,(13)) (2) for each Ii. We assume that the functions u/, are smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, implying that Mr. h exhibits strict risk aversion in his evaluation of lotteries. Underlying tastes-as described by the function u1-are obviously independent of' sunspot activity, since the only effect of' s on a/, is through its effect on the allocation x/,(s); because of' (2), sunspot activity, unlike (say) rainfall, has no direct effect on the consumer's well-being. Since specifications (1) and (2) ensure that s is extrinsic, we are justified in referring to it as a measure of sunspot activity.
It is no surprise that underlying tastes are unaffected by urncertainty for von Neumanrn-Morgenstern consumers. In the axioms defining von Neumann-Morgenstern behavior, uncertainty is no more than the basis for constructing lotteries. We adopt the specification (2) partly because the expected utility hypothesis is so familiar, but we have another reason.
Equations (1) and (2) imply that uncertainty is extrinsic, but taken together these conditions are more severe than is necessary. In particular, von Neunmann-Morgenstern preferences are not the only ones which are unaffected by uncertainty. The more basic assumption would be that the consumer is indifferent between otherwise identical lotteries generated by different random variables. The utility function defined over prospective consumption plans is parameterized by subjective probabilities. If' Mr. h is concerned only with lotteries and is not affected by sunspots per se, his preferences satisfy
Vlx(x/(), xlj(a); rl(Co), a,43p)) = v1,(xl,(a), xlj(); lj(p), aljoX)). (3)
That is, Mr. h is interested only in payoff's and their respective probabilities-not in the "names" given to the states of nature. Our assumption (2) clearly entails (3). And it entails more. The separability introduced in (2) implies that Mr. h's consumption plan will be intertemporally consistent, that with perfect foresight he will not revise his plan after uncertainty has been revealed. (See Donaldson and Selden [1981] for further elaboration of' this point.) Intertemporal consistency is essential to much of our analysis.
In most of' the sequel-but the exceptions are significant-we assume that belief's about sunspot activity are the same for each con-sumer, that is, X/1(a) = X((x) so that nlj(f) = n(f) (4) for each h. The commonly held probabilities, aT(a) and ai(3), can be thought of' as objective probabilities, but that is not necessary. Equations (4) can also be taken as a strong version of' the rational expectations hypothesis. A good case can be made against the realism of this assumption. In part, however, imposing (4) is like tying one hand behind one's back. Without (4) the point we shall make is easy to establish,3 but even with (4) we shall establish that sunspot activity can affect the allocation of resources.
We say that extrinsic uncertainty matters to the allocation of resources (or, simply, sunspots matter) if' some consumer's allocation depends on the state of' nature, that is,
for some h. If', on the other hand, all consumers' allocations are independent of the state of' nature, that is, xIO(a) = x/4(3)
for each h, then we say that extrinsic uncertainty does not matter to the allocation of resources (or simply, sunspots do not matter). These definitions will be restated in terms of' prices, instead of the quantities xx,, after market behavior has been introduced. The definitions could also be restated in terms of' utilities. For example, sunspots would not matter if'us, (xX, ((x)) = unl (x, (13)) for each It. The utility-based definitions would be more appropriate in a general setting, but it turns out that these three ways of' defining whether or not sunspots matter are equivalent under our simplifying assumptions of' strict risk aversion and smooth utility functions." account for time and states of' nature. There is, however, one f'undamental and significant aspect of' actual dynamic economies which is not reflected in the usual Arrow-Debreu framework. In the real world, the market trading process itself' takes place in time. Trades can include promises to deliver commodities in the future under specific circumstances, but each of the parties to a trade must be alive on the trading date. Even if currently alive individuals can know today the prices which will prevail in the future, they simply cannot trade today with individuals whose birth dates are in the future. Even in a world where birth dates and death dates vary across individuals, one can readily conceive of' the existence of' a complete array of markets. What cannot be imagined, however, is that thcre could be unrestricted participation in these markets. At any given time, some of the potential actors have already left the stage, while others have yet to come onstage. The distinction between the assumptions of complete markets and unrestricted market participation is important. Throughout the present paper, we assume that markets are complete. We show that the essential nature of the equilibriulml allocation process is altered when the natural restrictions on market participation are incorporated into the analysis.
III. Market Participation
We now return to the f`ornmal model. Consumers were introduced in the previous section. Here, we place those consumers in time and then describe the market structure f'or the abstract economy. The timing of' trades is of critical importance. We urge the reader to rely heavily on figure 1, our time line.
We assume that there are two generations. Consumers in generation 0 (Go, for short) are born at the "beginning of' time" and live to the "end of' time." Consumers in generation 1 (CI, f'ur short) are born later than those in G0 but, like those in GCJ, live to the end of' time.
(This simple demography provides the basis for a finite-horizon overlapping-generations model.) The consumers in Go) are born l)ef'ore sunspot activity is revealed. They can trade with each other on the market f'or securities which are contingent on the outcome of the extrinsic random variable, sunspot activity. They can also trade with each other and members of' G' on the spot, market f'or commodities, which meets after the observation of' sunspot activity. On the other hand, consumers in G1 are born after the degree of' sunspot activity is known. They can trade with each other and consum-ners from (P on the spot commodities market, but, of course, they cannot tradIe on the securities market, which must convene before they are born. Thus, participation in the commodities market is unrestricted, while participation in the securities market is necessarily restricted.
Three assets can be traded on the securities market. Money, all of which is issued by consumers, is the unit of account. Without loss of generality, the nominal interest rate on money can be set equal to zero, so that a consumer who purchases a dollar on the securities market is able to exchange it on the spot market for one dollar's worth of commodities. A consumer who has issued a dollar of (inside) money on the securities market can pay off this debt by delivering a dollar's worth of commodities on the spot market. Let ltl, be the purchases (or sales, if negative) of inside money by consumer h1 (in Gol) on the securities market.
A unit of money represents a promise which entitles the holder to a dollar's worth of commodities no matter what state of nature is observed. In our model, money is interesting only as a unit of account. There is no need for a pure store of value in this simple economy. Nor does money serve as a hedge against uncertainty. We next describe the mechanism by which consumers in Go can hedge against sunspot activity.
Consumers in Go are assumed to be able to buy and sell securities, the payoffs from which are contingent on sunspot activity. Discussion of the constraints in (7') is in order. The first constraint tells us that consumers in G1) must finance their purchases of securities from their sales of other securities. This seems to US to be a realistic assumption, but it is not essential. In the next section, we show that consumers in Go) behave as if' they were facing a complete array of Arrow-Debreu contingent-clainms markets. The first constraint is written as an equality, which suggests nondisposability of seculrities. This is a technical maneuver made to simplify the analysis. The second and third constraints in (7') are based on an assumption of rational expectations: Sunspot activity is uncertain, but consumers in GO) have perfect foresight about the prices which will prevail in each of the two states of nature. Then, in each state of nature, commodity purchases are financed by the sales of other commodities, net holdings of inside money, and net holdings of the security which pays off in that pal-ticular state.
Life is relatively simple for consumers in G 1. Before they are born, sunspot activity has been observed. These consumers do not have to make decisions under uncertainty, nor do they need to form expectations about prices. A consumer It in G' chooses a consumption vector xI,(s) which maximizes his utility subject to his market constraints, that is, which solves Whichever state of nature has occurred, the consumer in (J maxim-izes his utility. His consumption is financed from the market value of his endowments.
The market behavior of consumers is completely described by the system (7') and (8'). The next section treats market equilibrium.
IV. Market Equilibrium
A market (or competitive) equilibrium can be defined by a system of prices for which consumer demands are consistent with constrained utility maximization and for which materials balance. The equations in (9') require that for each of' the three (nondisposable) securities (including money) demand is equated to supply. The sums in these equations are taken over Go, reflecting two of our assumptions: (i) participation in these markets is not possible for consumers in G1; and (ii) there is neither outside (i.e., government) money nor outside securities. Money taxes and transfers could have been included. However, since the time horizon is finite, unless the sum of taxes exactly equals the sum of transfers, the equilibrium price of money would necessarily be zero. This is the well-known problem of "hot-potato" money, which can be avoided in models with an unbounded time horizon (see, e.g., Cass and Shell 1980). The inequality in (9') states that aggregate demand for each commodity in each state cannot exceed the corresponding aggregate supply. The sums are taken over H, since there are no restrictions on commodity-mnarket participation.
An immediate implication of equilibrium in the securities market can be drawn. Each consumer in G" must be indifferent between holding one unit of' money or one unit of each of the two contingent securities. Hence, in equilibrium, the price of the composite commodity "one unit of sunspot security and one unit of nonsunspot security" must be equal to the price of money. This idea is formalized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: A market equilibrium price vector (pj(cv), pl)q(), p(t), p113)) must satisfy pdjot) + pb(P) = 1. PROOF: Assume that pb(O-) + pi}13) < 1. Each consumer in CO is then able to sell money and purchase more units of each of the contingent securities than the number of dollars which he sold. Consider, for instance, financial plans (mnh, bh,(cx), b,(13)) with the property that bjj(s) = (-Mi,)/(Pb (0) + P,(13)) for s = a, 13. Such plans clearly satisfy the equality constraint in (7'). Furthermore, for each number N, there is a plan from this class which satisfies ml, + bl,(s) > N for s = c, P. Hence, the right-hand sides of the second and third constraints in (7') can be made arbitrarily large, so that consumers in Go can enjoy arbitrarily large consumption in each of the two states. This contradicts the inequality in (9'); consumers in H can supply at most a finite amount of the commodities. Assuming p1jot) + Pb(P) > 1 leads to a similar contradiction. In this case, consumers in Go are able to make arbitrarily large the right-hand sides of the second and third constraints in (7') by selling each of' the two contingent securities in equal (but large) quantities while using the revenue to purchase money. The proof by contradiction is complete. Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that, in equilibrium, there can be no pure arbitrage-profit opportunities on the securities market. The proof of proposition 1 also establishes that, at equilibrium prices, a consumer in Gil can choose to buy or sell any quantity of money without constraining his consumption opportunities by this choice. Suppose that at equilibrium prices (Pb(00, P1(), PJ0), p113)), In order to simplify matters here, we have excluded this equilibrium. If the price of money is zero, then the prices of contingent securities must also be zero. This amounts to assuming that the securities market is closed, so that, in effect, all consumers are restricted from the securities market, which yields essentially the same equilibria as in the model where H = G'.
Our contingent securities are exactly those studied by Arrow (1964) . When perfect foresight and von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities are assumed, the traditional model with complete (Arrow) securities markets and complete spot markets is equivalent to the traditional model with complete (Arrow-Debreu) contingent-claims markets. This insight allows us to replace the equilibrium system (7')-(9') with another that turns out to be easier to analyze. The analysis will be in terms of the new, more compact model, but the realism of our formulation is best judged by the extended model, (7')-(9'). We next formulate the reduced-form model and establish its equivalence to the extended model.
The price of a contract to deliver one unit of commodity i = 1, 2 if state of nature s = a, 13 occurs is denoted by p'(s). We denote the vector of state-s prices (pl(s), p2(s)) by p(s) and the full vector of contingent-claims prices (p (a), P (13)) (pl(a), p2((P), pl(1), p2 (1)) by p. Consumer h in G" chooses a prospective consumption plan x1h = (Xx(a), Xh(13)) that maximizes his expected utility subject to his market constraints, that is, that solves maximize rT(c)0Uh(Xh(a)) + rT(P)UI,(X/,(1)) subject to P Xh P -WI,
and Xh 0 for h in G". The value of his prospective consumption plan p x= P(00) *xh(O) + P(13) *x,(3) must not exceed the value of his prospective endowments, p * wh = P(0) * W,(0) + P(13) * W3). Consumers from G(' are also able to trade on the market for spot commodities at prices pM(s) for s = at, P. In the full-blown version of this model,5 an equilibrium condition (in fact, a zero-arbitrage-profit condition analogous to that described in proposition 1) is that the vectors p(s) and pj(s) be proportional, so that without loss of generality we can set pa(s) = p(s) 
where x = (xi,(a), xi,(13)) is the solution to (7) for h in G" and to (8) for h in G'. Inequality (9) is the materials balance condition. The prices in the system (7')-(9') are dollar prices. There is no obvious unit of account for the reduced system (7)-(9). We have not chosen a normalization. If p solves (7)-(9), then so does any nonnegative vector proportional to p. Thus, if p is unique up to a scalar multiple, then we say that the equilibrium is unique.
We establish in the following proposition that the economy described by (7)-(9) is in all essentials equivalent to the one described by (7')-(9') or, more accurately, that the former is a reduced-form version of the latter. PROPOSITION 2: (i) If the price vector (pi,, p,) = (pljo_), Pb(f), p((a), P(13)) is a market equilibrium for the extended economy described by (7')-(9'), then any nonnegative price vector p = (p(u), p(13)) which is proportional to the vector (pb(c)pj(), pb(13)pk()) is a market equilibrium for the reduced economy described by (7)-(9). (ii) If = (p(c), p(13)) is a market equilibrium for the reduced economy described by (7)-(9), then there is a nonnegative price vector (p1', P) = (PN(), pN(13), P,-(o-), p(13)), with (p,((), P(13)) proportional to (p(o_)/pb(o_), p(P)/pb(p)), which is a market equilibrium for the economy described by (7')-(9'). PROOF: (i) Assume that (ph, p,) is a solution to (9') and that the corresponding equilibrium allocation for consumer h in H is xI. Set p equal to X[P&(O)P,(0j), ph(b)pV()], where X is a positive scalar. Since Xph(s) is a positive scalar for s = a, 13, p and x1, for h in G1 satisfy (8).
The clearing condition (9') entails (9), so it remains to show that p and x1h for h in Go) satisfy (7). The first three constraints in (7') reduce to We can take bl (a) to be an unconstrained slack variable fbr the system above. Therefore, after multiplying by X and using proposition 1, we can combine the two inequalities above to yield a more compact description of the constraints on the consumption plan of h in Go, namely, p* x1-p * W. The proof of part i is complete. (ii) Assume that p is a solution to (9) and that the corresponding equilibrium allocation for consumer h in H is xh. Set p, equal to X[p(0-)/Pb(0-), P(P)/P/(1)], where X is a positive scalar, and Pb(u) and Pb(13) are positive fractions satisfying pb (0) + Pb () = 1. Then for h in G', x1, obviously satisfies (8') at spot prices p(. Next turn to (7'). Set ml, = 0 for h in Go)-which can be done without sacrificing any consumption opportunities for Mr. h-so that by construction the money market equilibrium condition in (9'), l;om1, = 0, is satisfied. Remember that the allocation xI, solves (7) at prices p. Solve the equation where bl(c) is a slack variable, which yields the result that, in the commodity space, the budget set implied by (11) is the same as that implied by the (equality form of the) single budget constraint in (7). Hence, if x/, is a solution to (7) at prices p, then (x/,, il,= 0, b,,) is a solution to (7') at prices (p, p,). Finally, it follows from (9) that the materials balance condition, 1,1xh, L; ,1 wA, is also satisfied. The proof' of part ii is complete.
In the sequel, the (simpler) reduced form of' the model, (7)-(9), replaces the (seemingly more realistic) extended form of the model (7')-(9').
In Section II, we defined whether or not sunspots matter in terms of commodity allocations. An alternative definition, based on the equilibrium prices p = (p(o), p(13)), can now be given. Because of' the invariant endowment assumption (1), the von NeumannMorgenstern utility hypothesis (2), the rational expectations postulate (4), and the strict risk-aversion assumption, we can say that sunspots matter if (p(o)/ir(o)) #4 (p(P)/la(p3)); otherwise, sunspots do not matter.
Prior to our fascination with sunspots (and other instances of' extrinsic uncertainty), most general equilibrium economists and many commonsense economists had an instinct about what role should be assigned to sunspots in economic models: Ignore them! We refer to the parallel system in which sunspots are ignored as the certainty model; the corresponding equilibrium is, then, the certainty equilibrium. We next formally define certainty equilibrium, allowing a comparison to be made between this equilibrium concept and ours.
Consider the economy described in the preceding pages, but ignore ( The assumption of unrestricted participation means that there are no consumers in Gi; G' is empty. Then, the set of all consumers H is identical with the set of unrestricted consumers G(. Our formal model is then completely described by (7) and (9). We next state our fundamental result on the structure of equilibrium with unrestricted market participation; assumption (4) is critical. A close reading of proposition 3 and its proof reveals that it can be taken as a direct adaptation for our purposes of' an important theorem of Malinvaud (1972) . Although condition (1) is extremely natural, it is stronger than is required for proposition 3. As in Malinvaud's analysis, the assumption that WI(cv) = W, (13) for each h could be weakened to 1XwI(0o) = j1wI(13). See also Balasko (forthcoming). Figure 2 is a diagrammatic illustration of propositioH 3. This example underscores the fact that proposition 3 is based on the simple idea that rational, risk-averse individuals sharing the same belief's will not take opposite sides of a bet, even if it is a fair bet. Allocations on the diagonal of' the square yield tangency of indifference curves. Under the assumption of' strict concavity, therefore, any allocation off the diagonal is Pareto dominated by some allocation on the diagonal. Consequently, since endowments lie on the diagonal, there are no mutually acceptable trades: Sunspots cannot matter.
Proposition 3 is critically dependent on the assumption that consumers share common beliefs about the probability of' sunspots. Diff'ering belief's are a powerful motivation for trading in contingent claims. In figure 3, once again endowments lie on the diagonal of the square. On the diagonal, the slope of Mr. h's indifference curve is given by the ratio of his subjective probabilities, ( Proposition 3 can also be extended to apply to uncertainty which does not affect tastes or aggregate endowments but does affect individual endowments. The reader can supply the argument by using figure 2. Mark an endowment which is off the diagonal. Then show that competitive equilibrium allocations must lie on the diagonal.
VI. Restricted Market Participation
In this section, we show that even when probability beliefs are held in common the traditional (certainty) equilibrium concept is too narrow. We first establish an equivalence between traditional equilibria and equilibria in which sunspots do not matter. We then show that there can be other market equilibria equilibria in which sunspots matter.
The following proposition assumes shared probability belief's but is valid for either restricted or unrestricted market participation. 
distinct equilibria, p(o)/,T(o) 5 p(p)/,T(p); that is, p is a imnarket equilibrium in which sunspots matter. (ii) Suppose p is a market equilibrium and that p(ot)/,T(p) # p(p)/kT(p). Then, the two price vectors pI = (,r(t)p(t), T(3)p(t)) and pi = (TT(0)P(P), T(P3)p(P)) represent distinct equilibria in which sunspots do not matter because p. is a solution to (9) when H = G1 for j = 1, 2 while TT(o)p(s) /T(o) w(P)p(s)/1r(P)
for s = a-, 3.
In observation 1, we give a method for constructing sunspot equilibria. Consider any economy in which all market participation is restricted and in which there are multiple certainty equilibria and thus multiple nonsunspot equilibria. A sunspot equilibrium is constructed as a lottery over certainty equilibria. For example, consider such an economy with two distinct certainty equilibria, qi and q2. No one is able to trade in securities, but sunspot activity has been recorded (in, say, its effects on rocks). Consumers believe that if there had been sunspots, the price vector p(a-) = qi would prevail; otherwise P(P) = q2 would prevail. Consumers' price-expectation formation is rational. These prices prevail simply because people believe they will. Sunspots matter.
Observation 1 is based on a completely degenerate case (included mostly for purposes of motivation): All consumers are excluded from the securities market. The next observation is based on an economy in which there is a single consumer able to participate in the securities market and another consumer who is unable to participate in the securities market. (In fact, the observation remains valid when we assume that there are many consumers in G'.) As in the previous example, sunspots can matter and sUflspOt equilibria are (only) based on lotteries over certainty equilibria. (14) where Ki is the (optimal value of the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange) multiplier associated with the budget constraint in (12) for It = 0 when the price vector q is set equal to q1 forj = 1, 2. Then, on the one hand, the concave programming problem (12) It should be remarked that, in rational expectations models of economies with outside money, we typically face a vast multiplicity of certainty equilibria (cf., e.g., Cass and Shell 1980; Balasko and Shell 1981). Whether or not this vast multiplicity has implications for the existence of monetary equilibria in which sunspots matter has yet to be investigated in a systematic way. While the results reported in observations 1 and 2 might suggest that sunspot equilibria are likely to be important in monetary economies, there are good reasons to be cautious in making any such conjecture.
Indeed, focusing on observations 1 and 2 could be misleading. In the specific models treated in this section, sunspot equilibria are in essence found by randomizing over (two) certainty equilibria. An example in the Appendix shows that this is by no means the only source of sunspot equilibria. For the model with two consumers in Go and one consumer in GC1, we construct endowments, beliefs, an(l preferences for which there is a unique certainty equilibrium but there is also (at least) one sunspot equilibrium. Obviously, then, the sunspot equilibrium cannot be thought of as a lottery over certainty equilibria. Moreover, the example clearly establishes that multiplicity of certainty (or non1sunspot) equilibria is not required for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium.
We close this section with our principal result on the possibility of sunspot equilibria.
PROPOSITION 5: In the rational expectations economy with natural restrictions on market participation, there can be equilibria in which sunspots matter. PROOF: It follows from observation 1 or observation 2 and the wellknown possibility that traditional (certainty) equilibria can be nollunique. The proposition also follows directly from the Appendix.
VII. Sunspots and Welfare
Normative analysis in the dynamic setting is not merely a simple extension of normative analysis based on the atemporal econoIfy. For example, in infinite horizon models with overlapping finite-lived consumers but no uncertainty, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics must be cast, not in terms of efficient or Pareto-optimial allocations, but rather in terms of short-run (or weakly) efficient or Pareto-optimal allocations.(3 Our present concern is not with the ef- 
Thus, every Pareto-optimal allocation is dynamically Pareto optimal, but the converse is not true. The next two propositions are our formal welfare results. Market equilibria are identified with dynamically Pareto-optimal allocations. Nonsunspot equilibria are identified with Pareto-optimal allocations. PROPOSITION 6: Every market equilibrium allocation is dynamically Pareto optimal. Every dynamically Pareto-optimal allocation can be achieved as a market equilibrium allocation under some assignment of endowments which may depend on sunspot activity (or, equivalently, under some lump-sum tax-subsidy scheme which may depend on sunspot activity).
PROOF: It follows directly from (7)-(9) and the traditional theorems of welfare economics (see, e.g., Arrow and Hahn 1971, chap. 4), when Mr. h(a) and Mr. h(3) are treated as separate individuals if h is in G1. If h(a) and h(3) are to be treated separately, then obviously for the second part of the proposition, "their" endowments, w,(cx) and w,(r3), will not in general be equal. PROPOSITION 7: Every market equilibrium allocation in which sunspots do not matter is Pareto optimal. Every Pareto-optimal allocation can be achieved as a market equilibrium allocation (in which sunspots do not matter) under some assignment of endowments which is independent of sunspot activity (or, equivalently, under some lump-sum tax-subsidy scheme which is independent of sunspot activity).
PROOF: It follows from the equivalence of (traditional) certainty equilibria and nonsunspot equilibria-see proposition 4-together with the traditional theorems of welfare economics.
The Pareto-optimal allocations form a subset of the dynamically Pareto-optimal allocations. The Pareto-optimal allocations are, in fact, those dynamically Pareto-optimal allocations for which the planner has fixed the relative welfare weights between Mr. h(ca) and Mr. h(3) (for h in Go) equal to the relative likelihoods of birth state a. and birth state P. This may or may not be a socially desirable procedure.8 If it is deemed worthy, though, it provides a justification for government intervention to offset the real effects of sunspots. Put another way, those who hold briefs for the traditional Pareto criterion as an ethical norm should tend to be especially sympathetic to government stabilization policies designed to counteract the effects of sunspots.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
In truly dynamic economies, there are inescapable restrictions on market participation. We have shown that the traditional notion of equilibrium in dynamic models is too narrow. Sunspots can matter.
How much do sunspots matter? Are sunspot equilibria "likely" relative to flof5Ufpot equilibria? Are they stable to shocks, including variations in government policies~ We expect to be able to analyze these issues in the model developed in this paper. The model must be extended, however, in order to be able to analyze the macro-oriented questions raised by sunspot activity. We could then ask: Are sunspot equilibria more "likely" in monetary than in nonmonetary economies? What policies should the government pursue in the face of sunspot activity '
Appendix
The special demographic structure underlying observations 1 and 2 allowed us to provide simple examples of market equilibria in which sunspots matter. In those particular examples, all sunspot equilibria are merely lotteries over certainty equilibria. Here we substantiate our claim that this result does not generalize.
For this purpose, we construct an economy in which there is a unique certainty equilibriu-ancd thus, by propositioml 4, a unique nonsunspot equilibriunm-yet in which there is at least one sunspot equilibriumL. In other words, we establish that, in general, multiplicity of certainty equilibria is not required for there to be an equilibrium in which sunspots matter.I() OLurexample, therefore, also illustrates the basic point that an equilibriumn in which sunspots matter need not be based on a lottery over certainty equilir-icla.
(consider the general formulation which is the centerpiece of Section VI. It
We tend to )elieve that this approach is not compelling.
We have beell (liscLIssinlg the "micro" qolestionls Withl Yves Balasko. We expect tie recent advances in overlapping-generations theory to l)e of ose for the "macro" prol)-lems. We shoUld record here that "snsplot acti vity" has also l)een observed to he enianating from Costas Azariadis, Roger Goesnerie, anid Steve Spear.
In ouir current research with Yves Balasko, we have coml)lete(l the circle l)y (1ml-onstrating the converse result as well, namely, that the existence of SIn1S)ot eqojilibria is not necessary for there to he nmiltiplicity of certainty eqililibria. It is also noteworthy that the same analysis establishes that, generically, the sort of example we present here will have an even numl)er of sunspot euclifibria.
we are to go beyond observations 1 and 2, there must be at least two consumers in Gi. Hence, assume now that there are two consumers, Mr. () \ and Mr. OB, born before sunspot activity is observed, and one consumer, Mr. 1, born afterward. These consumers will turn out to be very nicely behaved. As in the main body of the paper, utility functions satisfy standard assumlptions (e.g., monotonicity and smoothness). Furthermore, demand functions are of the textbook variety (e.g., both commodities are normal goods for each consumer, and the first commodity is a gross substitute for the second). The reason for presenting the example here-rather than in Section VI-is that its construction is, of necessity, somewhat intricate.
In constructing this example, we adopt the following strategy: First, we specify an endowment vector which is independent of sunspot activity-that is, so that v,(s) = wU, for 1i = OA! 0)6, 1 and s = x, P3. Then we choose a contingent-claims price vector so that sunspots will matter-that is, so that p0(0) is not proportional to p(p)-and a commodity allocation vector that is affordable (by each consumer) and feasible (for the economy), which satisfy the additional properties is satisfied, it is further established that the construction is compatible with uniqueness of' certainty equilibrium. This program will be carried out in two steps. First, using the utility specification (A3), we exhibit an equilibrium p in which sunspots niatter (and which will not generally reduce to a lottery over certainty equilibria). Second, using (fbr the first time) the elasticity condition (A4), we establish that this sort of equilibrium is consistent with there being only one certainty equilibrium q.
SrEP 1: We begin by specifying endowments and designing prices and allocations which admit sufficient degrees of' freedom to enable us then to select suitable probabilities and utility functions. The reader is urged to consult figure 5, which provides a geometric illustration of' the method for dlesigning the price-allocation pair. (The representation of xx, in terms of the parameters Ih and H0, turns out to be useful in subsequent calculations. Also, note that a whole subscript, e.g., 0N, is used in denoting a variable, while a partial subscript, e.g., A, is used in denoting a particular value of that variable. Thus, XA is a particular value of the variable x0() x is a particular value of the variable xI, and so forth.) When one refers to figure 5, it should be clear that, given the price vector (pa, 1, p9, 1), the allocation vector (x/\(a, x.X(\), XB1(0), X13(a), X(a), X(a)) satisfies the budget and nonnegativity constraints in (7) and (8), as well as the materials balance condition (9). Thus, for the first step of our program, all that remains is to verify that with judicious choices of probabilities and utility functions, the allocation vector also yields optimal solutions to the programming problems (7) and (8).
Consider us, having the additively separable form (A3) with 4,,: R --,f, R, --> R and gl,: R, --R (at least) twice continuously dlifferentiable, strictly increasing, and (at least for one of the functions, strictly) concave. Our ar 9u-ment will rely heavily on the elementary result that, given constants 0 < (j < A2 (respectively, (j < 0) and 0 < X < 1 (respectively, 0 < =-1), one can always find a function T: R, --R (respectively, T: R --R) which is smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly concave (respectively, concave) and which satisfies the conditions lirn P'(g) =x and P( 2) -X, respectively P'(i2 ) . In order to show that f'or this sort of' economy there can be only a single certainty equilibrium, it suffices to show that aggregate excess deman(1 f'or commodity 1 is strictly decreasingg in the relative price of' comnmodity 1 (when all consumers ignore sunspot activity). For this purpose, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the three consumers since each has the same type of' utility function and, hence, the same structure of' excess dleman(l. Thus, f'ollowing the lead from the last part of' Section IV, we now let prices of' coI1-modities be (q', q 2), the representative consumerIs (lemand f'or commodities be (W',y2), his endowment be (Z'l, Wl), his excess demand be (z', z) 
